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ABSTRACT 
There is increasing evidence that broad measures of firm-level corporate governance predict higher 
share prices.  However, almost all prior work relies on cross-sectional data.  This work leaves open 
the possibility that endogeneity or omitted firm-level variables explain the observed correlations.  We 
address the second possibility by offering time-series evidence from Russia for 1999-present, 
exploiting a number of available governance indices.  We find an economically important and 
statistically strong correlation between governance and market value in OLS with firm clusters and in 
firm random effects and firm fixed effects regressions.  We also find significant differences in the 
predictive power of different indices, and in the components of these indices.  How one measures 
governance matters.   
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1. Introduction 
There is evidence that broad measures of firm-level corporate governance predict higher 
share prices in emerging markets.  This evidence comes from both single-country studies 
(Black, 2001 on Russia; Black, Jang and Kim, 2006 on Korea; Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 
2003 on the U.S.) and multicountry studies (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Klapper and Love, 2004).  
However, most prior work relies on cross-sectional data.  This leaves open the possibility 
that endogeneity or bias due to omitted firm-level variables explain the observed correlations.  
Here, we address the omitted variable bias issue by offering time-series evidence from Russia 
for 1999-2004.  We find an economically important and statistically strong correlation 
between governance and market value in OLS with firm clusters and in firm random effects 
and firm fixed effects regressions. This work strengthens the case for a causal association 
between governance and firm market value, by ruling out some (though not all) of the non-
causal explanations for this association. 
Russia is an especially suitable laboratory for studying the effect of firm-level governance 
on firm value.  It combines a fair sized capital market, including many large, formerly state-
owned enterprises that were privatized during the 1990s, with notably bad governance at both 
firm and country levels.  Russian governance has improved substantially since 1999 (the 
beginning of our sample period).  Many leading Russian companies now seek external 
finance in international financial markets, prompting them to improve their corporate 
governance.  Likely not coincidentally, Russian share prices have soared during this same 
period.  While Russia’s real GDP grew at about 5% during this period, Russia’s stock market 
delivered average annual price increases of around 50%. 
Yet most Russian companies remain undervalued relative to their western competitors. 
For example, Gazprom, the world's largest oil and gas company based on reserves, had a 
market capitalization in October 2005 of only about $1 per barrel of proven reserves, 
compared to $18 for major Western oil companies such as Exxon Mobil and Royal Dutch 
Shell (Economist, 2005).  Part of this discount reflects domestic Russian energy price 
controls; part reflects political risk (as Russia's de facto expropriation of Yukos reminds us); 
but much reflects firm-level governance.  In particular, within Russian oil and gas   2
companies, Black (2001) finds a strong cross-sectional correlation in 1999 between 
governance and the market value of oil and gas companies per barrel of reserves. 
The improvements in Russian governance since 1999 create a natural experiment that lets 
us test the relationship between corporate governance and market value using a sample with 
significant variation both between companies and over time. In effect, our research exploits 
the out-of-equilibrium nature of Russian corporate governance, due to Russia's continuing 
transition to a market economy and its recovery from a 1998 financial crisis. 
Russia also provides us with time-series data on governance not available elsewhere.  
The importance of governance to Russian investors has spawned a number of efforts to 
measure the governance of Russian firms.  The Brunswick Warburg investment bank has 
rated governance since 1999; the Troika Dialog investment bank has done so since 2000, and 
Standard and Poor's has published disclosure ratings since 2002 and, for a limited number of 
firms, overall corporate governance ratings since 2001.  Two nonprofit organizations also 
rate firm governance:  the Institute for Corporate Law and Governance (ICLG) since 2001 
and the Russian Institute of Directors (RID) since 2004.  Our study exploits these measures.  
We present results for each measure and for an overall measure that aggregates information 
from each. 
The availability of a number of different indices, covering similar firms over a similar 
time period, lets us assess the predictive power of different approaches to measuring 
governance.  How one measures governance matters.  We find significant results for our 
overall measure, but also differences in the predictive power of different indices.  The 
Brunswick Warburg, Troika Dialog, and ICLG measures are strong in all specifications.  In 
contrast; the Standard and Poor's measures are significant in OLS but insignificant with firm 
fixed effects.  The RID measure is insignificant in all specifications.  At the subindex level, 
the strength of the overall indices comes primarily from a subset, sometimes a small subset, 
of the governance components included in the overall index.  For example, transfer pricing 
is important, and there is moderate evidence that financial disclosure is important.  But once 
we control for financial disclosure, other types of disclosure are not important. 
Our results are economically as well as statistically strong.  For our overall governance   3
measure, we estimate that, with firm fixed effects, a two standard deviation change in 
governance predicts a 0.12 increase. A worst-to-best change in governance predicts a 0.40 
change in ln(Tobin's q), or about 60% of a one standard deviation of ln(Tobin’s q). The 
coefficient on our aggregate measure of governance is smaller with firm fixed effects than in 
cross-section (.06 versus .17), suggesting that firm fixed effects are important.  In robustness 
checks, we obtain consistent results with market/book and market/sales as alternate measures 
of firm value. 
Share prices are the trading prices for minority shares.  Our study cannot show whether 
higher share prices reflect higher value for all shareholders, lower private benefits enjoyed by 
controlling shareholders, or some of both.  Put differently, we cannot test whether we have 
found an out-of-equilibrium situation, in which firms can increase firm value through 
governance changes, or an equilibrium situation in which firm value is maximized and gains 
to outside shareholders come at controlling shareholders' expense.  However, the voluntary 
governance improvements by a number of firms during the period of our study suggest that 
the initial situation was out-of-equilibrium, and that the gains to minority shareholders were 
only partly offset by reduced opportunities for self-dealing by insiders. 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews prior literature on the connection 
between firm-level governance and firm value or performance.  Section 3 describes our data 
sources and how we construct our governance index.  Section 4 covers methodology.  
Section 5 presents our main results.  Section 6 presents results for subindices.  Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2.  Literature Review:  New Steps in This Paper 
This paper addresses whether firm-level variation in overall firm-level corporate 
governance practices predicts firms' market values.  A large literature studies the link 
between  specific aspects of corporate governance (such as audit committee, independent 
directors, and takeover defenses, and minority shareholder protections) and firms' market 
value or performance.  A separate large literature explores the connection between country-
level rules affecting corporate governance and firm behavior and the strengths of securities   4
markets.  Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung (2005) provide a recent review.  Work on whether 
firm-level variation in overall  corporate governance predicts firms' market value or 
performance is more limited. 
Several studies find a connection between a measure of governance and share price in a 
single country.  Related papers studying emerging markets include Black (2001) (Russia); 
Black, Jang and Kim (2006) (Korea); Black, Kim, Jang and Park (2005) (Korea).  Another 
strand of this literature finds similar results on a cross-country basis (Durnev and Kim, 2005; 
Klapper and Love, 2004).  The positive share price reaction to cross-listing (e.g., Doidge, 
Karolyi and Stulz, 2004b) also suggests that governance can predict share price.  At the same 
time, efforts to understand the economic logic behind firms' governance choices have 
produced mixed results.  There is a large role for compliance with country norms (Doidge, 
Karolyi and Stulz, 2004a) and for idiosyncratic choice (Black, Jang and Kim, 2005).  While 
we focus here on emerging markets, related U.S. work includes Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 
(2003), Core, Guay and Rusticus (2005), and Gillan, Hartzell and Starks (2003). 
Most of the studies of firm-level governance have two important limitations.  Except for 
concurrent work in Korea by Black, Kim, Jang and Park (2005), all employ cross-sectional 
econometric approaches. Outside the U.S. panel data has not been available.  In the U.S., 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and Gillan, Hartzell and Starks (2003) have panel data, 
but report that governance changes too slowly to make a firm fixed effects approach feasible.  
Moreover, the cross-country studies have available only limited control variables.  These 
limitations raise the potential for omitted variable bias, in which omitted economic variables 
predict both governance and market value, leading to a spurious correlation between the two. 
A second problem with existing studies is the potential for the link between a 
governance index and share prices to reflect endogeneity, in which higher-valued firms 
choose better governance, rather than the other way around.  Most studies, ours included, 
lack a good instrument to address this issue (Black, Jang and Kim (2006) is an exception). 
There are two related studies of Russian corporate governance.  Black (2001) studies a 
small sample of 21 firms in 1999, with very limited control variables, but reports a strong 
correlation between a corporate governance index (the Brunswick index described below)   5
and the market value of Russian firms, as a percentage of their theoretical market value if 
priced at Western multiples (as estimated by Troika Dialog).  He finds a correlation between 
ln(market value/theoretical value) and governance of r = 0.90, and a worst to best governance 
change (from Gazprom and subsidiaries of Yukos at the low end to Vimpelcom at the high 
end) predicts a factor of 700 change in market value.  Goetzmann, Spiegel and Ukhov (2002) 
study governance explanations for the price differences between Russian preferred and 
common shares; their results are consistent with a sharp improvement in Russian corporate 
governance since 1999. 
This paper undertakes a further investigation of Russian corporate governance, and 
seeks to address the first gap in the prior literature -- the potential for omitted variable bias to 
explain the cross-sectional association between an overall governance measure and a measure 
of firm value.  We use governance indices over the time period for 1999-2004 -- a period of 
rapid improvement in Russian corporate governance -- and verify that the link between an 
overall governance index and firm value is both economically and statistically significant 
across pooled OLS (with firm clusters), firm random effects, and firm fixed effects models.  
The random and fixed effects approaches address omitted variable bias arising from 
unobserved heterogeneity that is firm-specific and time-invariant.  They also let us address 
time-invariant sources of endogeneity.  In addition, we employ a reasonably extensive set of 
control variables, which can address some of the potential sources of time-varying firm-level 
heterogeneity.  Our results thus rule out some (though not all) of the non-causal explanations 
for the observed relationship between governance and firm market value. 
A second advance of this study draws on the existence of multiple governance indices, 
covering an often overlapping set of firms in the same country over roughly the same time 
period.  This lets us investigate which aspects of governance predict firms' market value.  
We find that the indices vary substantially in emphasis (see Table 1) and ability to predict 
firm market values.  The variability in predictive power extends to the subindices which 
make up each index. 
   6
3.  Data 
3.1.  Governance data 
Russian market participants well understand the importance of governance in valuing 
Russian firms.  They have demanded governance information, and a variety of sources have 
responded.  There are currently six available corporate governance indices, from five 
different providers:  two major investment banks, one ranking agency (which produces two 
different products); and two nonprofit Russian organizations.  Table 1 summarizes the 
available corporate governance indices, the periods they cover, the subindices they use, and 
the weights given to each subindex.  We do not include 2005 rankings in this study because 
we cannot yet match it with financial data. 
Governance rankings are produced with a lag between data collection and publication.  
The ICLG index specifies the date as of which the rankings were compiled.  The other 
indices do not.  To match the effective dates of other rankings with financial and share price 
data, we assumed that a ranking published in the first half of quarter t relates back to quarter 
t-1.  Thus, we treat a report issued on Feb. 1, 2003 (in the first half of the 1st quarter of 
2003) as relating back to the fourth quarter of 2002, but treat a report issued on March 1, 
2003 (in the second half of this quarter) as relating to the current quarter (1st quarter of 2003), 
and so on. Indices are produced with different frequencies:  quarterly, semi-annual or annual.  
We construct our panel data with quarterly frequency. 
Brunswick UBS Warburg is a well known international investment company with 
strong interest in Russia. Its research department was the first to measure corporate 
governance in Russian companies, beginning in 1999 and continuing through the end of 2002.  
Black (2001) used their initial 1999 rankings, and found that they strongly predict firms' 
market values.  Brunswick advised us that they have not abandoned their rankings effort, but 
their most recent published report was in early 2003 and relates back to the 4th quarter of   7
2002).  Brunswick reports an overall governance score, which is the sum of the scores on 8 
subindices, for transparency, share dilution risk, asset transfer and transfer pricing risk, 
merger and restructuring risk, bankruptcy risk, ownership restrictions, corporate governance 
initiatives, and registrar risk. 
Some of these "governance" elements may seem odd from a Western perspective, but 
make sense within Russia.  Consider bankruptcy risk, for example.  In Russia, a bankruptcy 
filing, often by a fully solvent company, is a common means through which controlling 
shareholders squeeze out minority shareholders for minimal consideration; it is also a favored 
means for a hostile takeover, in which an outsider uses the bankruptcy process to acquire a 
controlling stake and squeeze out the former controlling owners.  A controlling shareholder 
can use a merger or restructuring for similar purposes.  Registrar risk involves the risk that 
the share registrar (whose records are the only official proof of ownership) will lose or freeze 
ownership if so requested by someone with influence (either a controlling shareholder or an 
outsider seeking to acquire control).  Transfer pricing is a common means for siphoning 
most or all profits out of a public company into an offshore affiliate that is wholly owned by 
the firm's controlling shareholders.  Share dilution through a large private offering of shares 
to the controlling shareholder or its (often undisclosed) affiliates at a fraction of true value 
was a major risk prior to 2002, when most firms did not provide preemptive rights (these 
rights became legally required in 2002). 
Troika Dialog is Russia’s largest and oldest investment bank.  Its research department 
began to measure corporate governance in 2000 and has continued to do so since, roughly 
annually.  It reports scores on five measures:  ownership structure and transparency; 
oversight and control structure; management and investor relations; corporate conduct; and 
information disclosure and financial discipline.  We weight these subindices equally to 
produce an overall governance index.   8
The Institute of Corporate Law and Governance is a nonprofit institute, launched in 
2000 to develop an investor protection system and upgrade the corporate governance culture 
in Russia.  Its principal founder, Dmitri Vasiliev, was the first Chairman of the Russian 
Federal Commission for the Securities Market and is known for his active campaign for 
investor rights in Russia.  The details of the ICLG corporate governance assessment are not 
publicly disclosed, but it includes components for information disclosure, ownership structure, 
board of directors and management structure, shareholder rights, expropriation risk, and 
corporate governance history.  The index is understood to draw in part on the OECD 
principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 1999, 2004).  ICLG produced quarterly 
rankings from 2000 through 2004. 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) is a leading international leading rating agency. It provides 
a variety of credit and other rankings worldwide.  In some countries, including Russia, it 
provides "transparency and disclosure" rankings for major firms based on public disclosure 
documents, plus governance rankings for individual firms which pay S&P to rate their overall 
governance and provide a corporate governance score.  The S&P Disclosure index covers a 
set of large public companies chosen by S&P.  S&P evaluates their public documents for 89 
potential disclosures.  In contrast, the S&P Governance rankings are not regular, and become 
publicly available only if a company hire S&P to prepare them and then chooses to reveal its 
ranking. 
The Russian Institute of Directors (RID) is a nonprofit entity founded in 2001 by a 
group of major Russian companies with the goal of improving Russian corporate governance 
and making investments in Russian companies more attractive.  In 2004 RID produced its 
first corporate governance ranking, prepared in cooperation with the Russian financial rating 
agency Expert.  The ranking was based partly on public information and partly on a survey 
of Russian companies and public information.  However, RID provides no details on how it   9
constructed its index.  The RID index covers substantially more companies than the other 
indices.  Of the 104 covered companies, 50 are not covered by any other index.  The RID 
index, unlike the the six available indices, has no significant predictive power in any of our 
three main specifications (pooled OLS with firm clusters; firm random effects, and firm fixed 
effects). 
Each governance index uses a separate scale.  In some, better governance leads to a 
higher score; in others, better governance produces a lower score.  To make the different 
indices comparable, we converte them to a standard normal distribution (mean 0 and standard 
deviation of 1), with higher scores indicating better governance. 
We use these standardized rankings to construct two principal aggregate indices.  In 
building an aggregate index, we confront two problems.  First, in some cases, more than one 
source ranks the same company in the same quarter.  We addressed this overlap in two 
different ways.  In the first, we averaged the available rankings of each company in each 
quarter. We call this our “quarter-averaged” index.  As an alternate procedure, which makes 
fuller use of the available ranking information at the cost of overweighting some firm-
quarters, we constructed a “pooled” index, which contains all available rankings for each 
company.  The pooled index can contain more than one ranking for one company in a single 
quarter, while the “quarter-averaged’ ranking will have a single value for each company in 
each quarter.  In regressions with the pooled index, we use dummy variables for each index.  
We obtain similar results from both approaches. 
A second problem is that different indices cover different companies.  Thus, an 
average score of 0 on the Brunswick index might be an above (or below) average score on 
another index, simply because the two indices cover different firms. 
Given the lack of predictive power of the RID index, we also construct aggregate 
quarter-averaged and pooled indices that exclude RID.  We obtain generally similar results   10
but, not surprisingly, somewhat larger coefficients and t-statistics with these "no RID" indices. 
Overall, we have 848 firm-quarter-index observations for the pooled index and 581 
firm-quarter observations for the quarter-averaged index, covering 114 firms for which we 
have the basic financial and stock price data needed to compute Tobin's q.  However, we 
drop to 105 firms when we require the data needed for our control variables.  Of these, 51 
are covered only by RID; the remaining 54 are covered by one or more of the other five 
indices.  Table 2 shows rankings availability and average governance scores for each index 
by quarter. 
Figure 1 plots all individual rankings and the RTS (stock market) index.  Individual 
indices are produced at irregular intervals and sometimes cover different firms at different 
dates.  To generate continuous lines in this figure we employed linear interpolation to 
generate rankings for firm-quarters without a ranking for a particular index which fall in 
between two quarters with a ranking for the same firm on the same index.
1 All rankings 
except Troika increase over time. 
On Figure 2 we plot two aggregated governance indices. This exercise presents three 
challenges: 1) rankings use different scales, 2) rankings are produced in different quarters 
(only several rankings overlap in some of the quarters) and 3) rankings cover somewhat 
different samples of firms. To address these challenges we use two approaches to ranking 
aggregation (which we employ mainly for the purposes of this figure). In the first approach, 
we use interpolated standardized governance rankings (as described above) and plot the 
average  change in governance (which is important to control for the varying sample 
composition from quarter to quarter). In the second approach, instead of standardizing the 
                                                       
1 Thus, if a firm was ranked in quarter t with score Rt and was next ranked in quarter t+k with score 
Rt+k, we assign the firm a score in quarter t+i (where t < t+i< t+k) using linear interpolation:  Rt+i= [(k-i)*Rt + 
i*Rt+k]/k.  We generate a combined interpolated quarter-averaged index, which we use in Figure 2, by average 
the interpolated scores across firms in each quarter.   11
individual rankings, we first interpolate them and then convert them to the Troika’s scale
2 
because Troika is the only ranking that overlaps with all other rankings both in terms of 
periods and the firms covered. Then we plot the average change in the converted rankings. 
Both approaches produce similar results – the average governance rankings are gradually 
increasing, in parallel with the RTS index.  
3.2.  Financial and Stock Market Data 
We supplement our governance data with data on stock market performance and 
financial statements. We construct market value of stocks using data on all trades from 
Russian Trading System (RTS www.rts.ru). For each stock we calculate quarterly average 
price and capitalization. We obtain financial data from System of Complex Revelation of 
Information (SCRIN www.scrin.ru ). It contains firm’s quarterly income statements and 
balance sheets in Russian accounting standards. 
Our sample is unbalanced panel with quarterly data. We include observation in the 
sample if in a quarter a firm has at least one corporate governance score; firm’s stocks were 
traded at least once in the quarter; and we have financial data for this company in the quarter. 
We classify firms in sectors by aggregating ISIC codes. Table 3 shows that most of 
our observations come from utilities, communication and extraction sectors; these three 
sectors represent almost 80% of our sample. Utilities include large energy producers and 
regional energy companies. Most of the firms in communication sectors are regional 
traditional communication companies, the rest are mobile communication companies. 
Extraction sector includes oil, gas, metals and coal extraction, refining companies and 
pipelines. 
Our main dependent variable is Tobin’s q, defined as Market value of assets / Book 
value of assets. Market value of assets is estimated as [market value of common stock + 
                                                       
2 We run a linear regression of each individual rankings and Troika rankings and use the regression 
coefficients to covert individual rankings to Troika’s scale.   12
market value of preferred stock + book value of debt]. In alternative specifications we also 
use market-to-sales and market-to-book ratios. To reduce the influence of outliers, we take 
logs of these dependent variables.
3 Table 4 contains variable definitions for our dependent 
and control variables. Variables that contain extreme values are winsorized at the 1 and 99
th 
percent level (these variables are indicated with the number 1 at the end of variable name in 
Table 4).  Summary statistics are presented in Table 5. Panel A presents means, percentiles 
and standard deviations and Panel B presents correlation table. 
In Figure 3 we present a scatter plot of our raw data: (log) Tobin Q and aggregate 
quarter-averaged governance index (stdall). The predicted values are obtained from a simple 
univariate regression of (log) Tobin Q on governance index, which produces the following 
coefficients (t-statistics obtained with firm-clustering in parenthesis):  
Ln(Tobin's q) = 0.052 (0.58) + 0.136 (1.84) * Quarter-averaged index 
There is a positive and significant (at 10%) relationship between Tobin's q and the quarter-
averaged index. 
 
4. Empirical Methodology   
To study the effect of corporate governance on firm valuation and performance we use 
the basic model 
Yit  = α + β1Gov it + γX it + e it                                           
Here Yit is one of the performance measures, Gov it is a governance rating, X it is a 
vector of control variables and e it is the error term. We use ln(Tobin's q) as our main measure 
of performance.  In robustness tests, we obtain similar results with raw Tobin's q, 
ln(market/sales) (market value of assets/sales) and ln(market/book) (market value of common 
                                                       
3 Market/book ratio contains some extreme observations even after the log-transformation.  We 
therefore drop the highest and lowest 1% of observations for this variable.  Our results for market/book are 
somewhat weaker if we include outliers.  Our results for Tobin's q and market/sales are similar with or without 
similar exclusion of outliers.   13
and preferred stock/book value of common and preferred stock).  Since our data is in panel 
form, the error term is a composite error, given by e it= v i + u it, where v i is the unobserved 
firm-specific effect and uit is idiosyncratic error. We estimate the regression model using 
several different assumptions about the composite error term. 
The OLS estimation assumes that there is no correlation between Gov it or X it and the 
composite error term e it, and is inconsistent if this assumption is violated. Even if this 
assumption holds, the composite errors will be serially correlated, due to the presence of v i in 
each time period. We therefore use standard errors that are clustered at the firm-level, which 
allow for a unspecified correlation structure of the errors within each firm. The Breusch-
Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test rejects the assumption that the variance of vi is equal to zero, 
suggesting that firm-specific effects are important and the OLS results are therefore 
inefficient (even under the assumption of no correlation).  
The random effects estimation provides efficient estimates under a more restrictive 
assumption that the unobserved firm-specific effect is uncorrelated with Gov it or X it. If, 
however, the firm-specific effects v i are correlated with the governance or the X’s, the results 
of the OLS and random effects are biased. The fixed effects estimator is consistent estimator 
under this assumption. We perform the Hausman test comparing fixed effects and random 
effects estimators and find that the test is not rejected for most of the individual governance 
rankings, but is rejected for the aggregate indices. Therefore, fixed effects model is the most 
appropriate model for our data.  
In addition, both fixed and random effects require an assumption of strict exogeneity - 
i.e. the errors need to be uncorrelated with the past and future values of the right hand side 
variables (this is a more restrictive assumption than is needed for OLS estimation, see 
Wooldridge (2001).  In other words, this assumption does not allow for a likely possibility 
that the future values of governance rankings depend on the past values of valuation and   14
performance measures. In our future work we will attempt to relax this assumption. 
The matrix X it contains a set of control variables which have been shown to be 
important in predicting market performance.
4 In our analysis we include the following 
control variables: the aggregate RTS market index (in logs) to control for economy -wide 
time-series variation in market values, firm size (measured by log of total assets), liquidity 
(measured by the log of the number of actual trades in a quarter), leverage (measured as book 
value of debt over book value of total assets), annual real sales growth as a control for firm 
growth opportunities, a measure of financial performance (net income over total assets), and 
an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is a part of MSCI index (as these firms are more 
likely to have more visibility). We also control for three main sectors – Communication, 
Utilities and Extraction industries, as these three industries together comprise about 80% of 
our sample. In addition, in some specifications we control for capital intensity, which maybe 
associated with both governance and performance (Klapper and Love, 2004). However, we 
have fewer observations for capital intensity and therefore we do not include it in our main 
specification. In robustness tests (section 4.2) we experiment with different specifications of 
control variables.  
 
5.  Principal  Results 
Table 6 reports our main pooled OLS results.  All governance indices except RID 
have a significant positive coefficient.  Brunswick, Troika, ICLG, and S&P Disclosure are 
significant at 1%, while S&P Governance, which has a much smaller sample size, is 
significant at 5%.  The coefficient on the combined "quarter-average" index suggests that a 
change of one standard deviation (which is equal to one since the individual indices are 
standardized to σ = 1) implies a 17 points increase in ln(Tobin's q).  The final column of 
                                                       
4 Black, Jang and Kim (2006), Durnev and Kim (2005), Klapper and Love (2004).    15
Table 6 adds ln(capital intensity) as an additional control variable.  This reduces the number 
of observations and slightly reduced the coefficient on the quarter-averaged index, but this 
index remains significant at 1%. 
Many of the control variables are significant in predicting Tobin Q. We find that 
overall market index is significantly positive, and this result is even stronger in fixed effects 
and random effects regressions. Interestingly, the firm size is negative, suggesting that larger 
firms have lower valuations relative to their assets. Not surprisingly, more liquid firms have 
higher Tobin’s q, suggesting that the market values reflect liquidity premium. The leverage 
results are strongly positive and somewhat puzzling. It could be that in Russia high leverage 
plays an informational role suggesting that the firm is “good enough” (or well-connected) to 
be able to obtain bank finance. Surprisingly, we find that sales growth is insignificantly 
related to valuation (and even negative in some cases). Note that our sales growth measure is 
annual sales growth (while the rest of our data are quarterly) and thus has less within firm 
variation. 
We find that firms included in MSCI index (about 25% of our sample in terms of the 
number of observations), have higher valuations, consistent with the idea that they are more 
visible and enjoy better analyst coverage. MSCI index dummy is significant at 1% in random 
effects regressions (not reported). 
Not surprisingly, firms that have better financial performance (measured by net 
income over total assets) have higher market valuations. Capital intensity is negative, 
suggesting that firms with more fixed capital (as a fraction of sales) have lower valuation. 
This is plausible because firms with more fixed capital are likely to have less intangible 
capital, and intangible capital is likely to be associated with higher market values. 
We also find strong sector-specific effects: not surprisingly, firms in Extraction 
industries (oil & gas extraction, coal mining, metal mining and pipelines except natural gas)   16
have significantly higher valuations, while Utilities (electric, gas and sanitary services) have 
significantly lower valuations. These sector-specific effects are even more pronounced in the 
random effects estimation (not reported). This clearly reflects the peculiarities of Russian 
economy – the extractive, export oriented industries are booming, while the utilities have 
trouble collecting money for their services from the largely impoverished population.  Firms 
in Communication industry have also lower valuations (since most of these firms are spin-
offs of the previously state-owned telephone companies). The rest of industries (subsumed in 
the constant term) present a heterogeneous group of manufacturing and services. 
Table 7 presents results for two alternative ways to aggregate different rankings. In 
the first method, referred to “quarter-averaged” aggregate index, we average all rankings 
available for each firm in the same quarter. In this specification, each firm is used once for 
each quarter that at least one ranking is available. In the second method, referred to as 
“pooled” aggregate index, we use all available data, which means that some firms will have 
duplicate observations for a single quarter, if this firm has more than one ranking. In this case 
all the control variables and the dependent variable are the same for these observations. The 
results are very similar in both cases. In the pooled regressions we also add dummy variables 
for each type of rankings. We find that firms ranked by RID have significantly lower average 
Tobin q. This is not surprising since RID ranking covers the widest sample of firms, while 
other rankings focus on the best of the market. This might explain why RID rankings are not 
significant in general. We also report the results for these aggregate indices without RID 
rankings and, not surprisingly, find that our results become stronger when we exclude the 
non-significant RID ranking. 
Table 8 presents a summary of coefficient estimates for the corporate governance 
indices using the same model (with and without capital intensity) estimated by OLS, fixed 
effects and random effects. To save space we do not report all the other coefficients in these   17
regressions; thus each cell in this table corresponds to a separate regression. (We report OLS 
results for comparison; note that first column reproduces the governance coefficients reported 
in Table 6). We find that in general the results are robust for all three estimation methods. 
However, some individual indices loose some of their significance (S&P Governance index is 
insignificant in random and fixed effects and S&P Transparency and Disclosure index is 
insignificant in fixed effects) most likely because of lack of within firm variation in these 
indices. The index produced by RID is never significant. We also report the results of two 
aggregate indices –the quarter-averaged and the pooled regressions (described above) and we 
rerun these aggregate indices with and without RID rankings. Both aggregate indices produce 
similar results, significant at 1%, and exclusion of RID index in general makes the result 
stronger. 
For our overall governance measure, we estimate that, with firm fixed effects, a two 
standard deviation change in governance predicts a 0.12 increase in ln(Tobin’s q), which is 
about 20% of one standard deviation of ln(Tobin’s q). A worst-to-best change in governance 
predicts a 0.40 change in ln(Tobin's q), or about 60% of a one standard deviation of 
ln(Tobin’s q). The coefficient on our aggregate measure of governance is smaller with firm 
fixed effects than in cross-section (.06 versus .17), suggesting that firm fixed effects are 
important. 
While our results are economically strong, the economic importance of governance 
falls well short of Black's (2001) prior study, in which a worst-to-best change in governance 
predicted a factor of 700 increase in market capitalization, as a fraction of hypothetical 
Western capitalization.  This difference deserves explanation. 
In hindsight, Black's prior study was conducted at a time when Russian corporate 
governance was at a low point -- with large variation between firms and a large fraction of 
firm value at stake through a firm's governance choices.  The gap between actual market   18
capitalization and theoretical Western market capitalization has substantially narrowed since 
then, with the worst governed firms showing the largest gains.  For example, Gazprom has 
gone from being valued at .002 of Western value (2.6 cents per barrel of reserves!) to being 
valued today at about .05 of Western value ($1 per barrel of reserves).  Lukoil has gone from 
being valued at .028 of Western value ($0.36 per barrel of reserves) to being valued today 
at .13 of Western value ($2.50 per barrel of reserves). 
 
5.2. Robustness Tests 
Here we test the robustness of our results to different specifications of dependent and 
independent variables. While we use (log) Tobin Q as our main performance measure, we 
also test two alternative measures: the Market-to-Sales (MTS) and Market-to-Book (MTB) 
measures of relative valuation. Table 9 reports the summary results (only the governance 
coefficients) for these two dependent variables, for OLS, random and fixed effects estimation. 
Again, each cell reports results from a separate regressions and all models include the same 
set of control variables as reported in Table 6, column 1.  
We find the main results to be generally robust – both of the aggregate indices are 
significant at least at 5% or better in all the regressions. As before, excluding RID ranking 
makes the results stronger. The individual indices have varying significance levels, all except 
RID are significant in MTS regressions and fewer are significant in MTB regressions (S&P 
Transparency and Disclosure and Brunswick indices are not significant in MTB regressions). 
In general, the MTB results are less significant than Tobin Q or MTS results. 
We also experimented with the various specifications for our control variables: we 
used year dummies instead of aggregate market index, and we also used a linear time trend 
(alone or in combination with the market index). The results were robust to these changes. 
We also used log of sales instead of log of total assets as a measure of size. This produced   19
even more significant results for MTS regressions, but less significant results for MTB 
regressions, the Tobin Q results were unaffected by this change. We tried different leverage 
measures (book value of debt over market value of assets, and book value of debt over book 
value of equity), and different performance measures (operating income to sales, and 
operating income to assets). Most of our results are robust to these various specifications 
(with the MTB results being the most sensitive to changes in specification, while Tobin Q 
results being the least sensitive). However, the overall picture remains largely unchanged – 
governance is significantly positively associated with different measures of firm valuation.  
 
6.  Results for Subindices  
In this section we take a more detailed look into the subindices that comprise several of our 
indices.  We lack data on subindices for RID and ICLG.  Table 1 reports the details on the 
subindices that are used to construct the remaining four indices. 
Often, different aspects of governance correlate with each other.  Table 5C shows 
the correlations among the Brunswick, Troika, S&P Disclosure, and S&P Governance 
subindices.  Some correlations are quite high, especially for the S&P indices.  Thus, we 
cannot simply replace a full index with a subindex and run regression similar to the full index 
regressions we report in Table 8.  This would introduce omitted variable bias, where the 
omitted variable is the remainder of the governance index being considered.  For example, in 
these individual regressions (not shown), each Troika subindex and each S&P Disclosure 
subindex takes a positive and statistically significant coefficient in pooled OLS regressions 
with firm clusters. 
Table 10 reports results from a tougher test:  We include each subindex of a 
particular index (Brunswick, Troika, S&P Disclosure, or S&P Governance) as a separate 
independent variable in a single regression, with pooled OLS, firm random effects, and firm   20
fixed effects specifications.  These regressions let us see which subindices are responsible 
for the predictive effect of the overall index.   
The results are somewhat sensitive to the empirical model. Two subindices – Troika 
index, Information Disclosure and Financial Discipline subindex, and Brunswick index, Asset 
transfers and transfer pricing subindex-  are significant or marginally significant in all three 
specifications.  Transfer pricing risk is overall the most powerful indicator overall, especially 
in firm random effects and firm fixed effects regressions, where it has t-statistics of close to 6. 
To unpack these two subindicies, Troika’s Information Disclosure and Financial 
Discipline subindex includes the following elements: Accounting standards (Russian vs. 
Western), Independence of External Auditor, Disclosure record with Russian securities 
regulators, presence of an ADR program, Registrar risk, and Dividend history.  Most of these 
elements involve financial disclosure.  The exceptions are Dividend history and Registrar 
risk.  Registrar risk is likely not a key driver, because Brunswick has a separate subindex for 
Registrar risk, which is insignificant in all specifications.  Thus, this subindex principally 
measures financial disclosure. 
Brunswick’s Asset transfers/Transfer pricing subindex includes two equally weighted 
subcategories: Controlling Shareholders, which assesses whether the controlling shareholder's 
recent track record on corporate governance, and Transfer Pricing, in which a firm is 
penalized for the presence of unclear trading environment and for use of offshore or affiliated 
trading companies. 
Other sources of evidence on the important of disclosure provide generally but not 
uniformly positive signals on its importance.  On the positive side, the Brunswick 
transparency subindex is positive and significant in firm random effects and firm fixed effects.  
The Troika ownership structure and transparency subindex (which includes ownership 
transparency) is significant or marginall significant with firm random effects and firm fixed   21
effects.  On the mixed side, the S&P Disclosure index is significant in pooled OLS, but 
progressively weakens as we move to firm random effects and then to firm fixed effects (see 
Table 8).  Table 10 shows that the power of S&P Disclosure index comes from the financial 
disclosure subindex, which shows the same pattern:  strong in OLS, weaker but significant 
with firm random effects, andinsignificant with firm fixed effects.  Surprisingly, the financial 
transparency and information disclosure subindex of S&P Governance (which one would 
assume is related to the full S&P disclosure index) takes a negative coefficient, which is 
marginally significant with firm fixed effects.  However, for S&P Governance, we have only 
34 observations of 11 firms.  With 10 control variables plus firm fixed effects, degrees of 
freedom are quite limited, and any results are therefore suspect. 
Overall, the message is that only some subindices are important in predicting market 
valuation and that it matters how one measures governance. Asset transfer and transfer 
pricing risk is the most correlated with market valuations (as is confirmed by numerous 
stories and anecdotes in Russian media).  Disclosure, especially financial disclosure may 
also be important. 
  
7. Conclusion 
Most studies of the connection between firm-level corporate governance and share prices are 
limited to cross-sectional data and simple OLS specifications.  We study the connection 
between the firm-level governance of Russian firms and their market values over 1999-2004, 
a period of dramatic change in Russian corporate governance.  The importance of corporate 
governance to investors in Russian firms has spawned no less than six different indices.  We 
draw on all six here.  A combined indexis economically and statistically strong across all 
specifications:  pooled OLS with firm clusters; firm random effects, and firm fixed effects; 
our results are also robust to choice of firm value variable (Tobin's q, market/sales ratio, or 
market/book ratio).  This work strengthens the case for a causal association between firm-  22
level governance and firm market value, by ruling out some (though not all) of the non-causal 
explanations for this association. 
The availability of different indices, covering similar firms over a similar time period, lets 
us assess the predictive power of different approaches to measuring governance.  How one 
measures governance matters.  The Brunswick, Troika,, and ICLG measures are strong in all 
specifications.  The two S&P measures are significant in OLS but insignificant with firm 
fixed effects.  The RID measure is insignificant in all specifications. 
At the subindex level, the strength of the overall indices comes primarily from a subset, 
sometimes a small subset, of the governance components included in the overall index.  For 
example, financial disclosure is important, but once we control for financial disclosure, other 
types of disclosure are not.   23
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Table 1: Corporate governance indices and subindices 
Each governance index, the time period it covers, any available subindices, and the weights on each subindex.  
We convert each index to standardized form, with mean = 0, standard deviation =1, and higher scores indicating 
better governance.  We also compute combined governance indices, as defined below.  Brunswick changed its 
methodology after 1999.  We recalculated the 1999 scores using its post-1999 methodology.  Troika provides 
four subindices but no explicit weights; we assumed equal weighting.  ICLG provides no information on the 
weights given to subindices.  RID provides no information on subindices. 
Corporate governance rankings and their categories  Subindex weights
Brunswick UBS Warburg (Brunswick)  2nd qtr 1999 -- 4th qtr 2002   
Transparency  19.4% 
Dilution  18.1% 
Asset transfers / transfer pricing  13.9% 
Mergers / restructuring  13.9% 
Bankruptcy  16.7% 
Ownership restrictions  4.2% 
Corporate governance initiatives  12.5% 
Registrar  1.4% 
Troika Dialog (Troika)  3rd qtr 2000 -- 2nd qtr 2004   
Ownership structure and transparency  20% 
Oversight and control structure  20% 
Management and investor relations  20% 
Corporate conduct  20% 
Information disclosure and financial discipline  20% 
Institute of Corporate Law and Governance (ICLG)  1st qtr 2001 -- 1st qtr 2004   
Information disclosure  NA 
Ownership structure  NA 
Board of directors and management structure  NA 
Shareholder rights  NA 
Expropriation risk  NA 
Corporate governance history  NA 
Standard and Poor’s Corporate Governance (S&P 
Governance)  4th qtr 2000 -- 4th qtr 2004   
Ownership structure and influence  25.0% 
Financial stakeholder rights and relations  25.0% 
Financial transparency and information disclosure  25.0% 
Board structure and process  25.0% 
S&P Transparency and Disclosure (S&P Disclosure)  4th qtr 2002 -- 4th qtr 2004   
Ownership structure and investor relations  33.3% 
Financial and operational information  33.3% 
Board and management structure and process  33.3% 
Russian Institute of Directors (RID)  2nd qtr 2004 -- 4th qtr 2004   
No categories available  NA 
   
Aggregate governance indices:   
Quarter averaged index:  Union of all six indices.  If two or more indices cover the 
same firm in the same quarter, we average the governance scores.  n = 581 
Quarter averaged index (no RID).  Union of all indices except RID.  If two or more 
indices cover the same firm in the same quarter, we average the governance scores.  n = 506 
Pooled index.  Union of all six indices.  If two or more indices cover the same firm in 
the same quarter, we treat these as separate observations.  n = 848 
Pooled index (no RID).  Union of all indices except RID.  If two or more indices cover 
the same firm in the same quarter, we treat these as separate observations.  n = 714 
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Table 2.  Corporate governance rankings availability and average standardized corporate governance scores by quarter and rankings. 
Number of firms and average score in each period for the Brunswick, Troika, S&P Governance, S&P disclosure, ICLG, RID, and combined standardized indices.  Indices are 
defined in Table 1. For each ranking we take average of normalized scores across firms in each quarter. Last columns corresponds to average of all indices. 
    Brunswick  Troika  ICLG  S&P Governance  S&P Disclosure  RID  combined indices 
No. of obs 
year quarter  No. of 
obs.  mean  No. of obs.  mean  No. of obs. mean No. of obs.  mean  No. of 








1  -   -   -   -    -    -         
2  8  -0.59  -   -   -    -    -    8  8 -0.59 






4  -   -   -   -    -    -         
1  13  -0.24  -   -   -    -    -    13 13  -0.24 
2  -   -   -   -    -    -         






4 13  -0.17  19  0.08  -    -    -    -    32  19  0.01 
1 -    37 -0.15  20  -0.07  1  -1.26  -    -    58  37  -0.23 
2  -   -   -   1  -0.10  -    -    1  1 -0.10 






4 14  -0.03  -    23  -0.40  1  0.01 -    -    38  23  -0.34 
1  -   -   24  -0.43  1  -0.80  -    -    25 24  -0.46 
2 15  0.33  39  -0.08 31  -0.18  1  0.36 -    -    86  43  -0.18 






4  23 0.40  -    23  0.01  2  -0.51 33 -0.42  -    81  37  -0.24 
1  -   -   23  0.05  3  -0.06  -    -    26 25  0.01 
2  -   -   23  -0.04  3  0.28  -    -    26 24  -0.02 






4  -   -   23  0.19  1  2.21  38  -0.05  -    62 39  -0.01 
1  -   -   23  0.31  4  0.07  -    -    27 25  0.27 
2  -   47  -0.10  -    4  0.27  -    100  -0.01 151 104  -0.13 






4  -   -   -   1  0.36  38  0.29  34  0.68  73 55  0.30 
No.  of  Obs.  99   197    275   34   109   134   848  581   
No. of firms  24    55    33    11    44    104      114     26
Table 3. Sample breakdown by sector. 
Number of firm-quarters in our sample, divided into industry sectors. 




Utilities 181  31.2% 
Communication 148  25.5% 
Extraction 127  21.9% 
Subtotal in these three sectors  456  78.6% 
Transportation Equipment  40  6.9% 
Other Manufacturing  29  5.0% 
Primary Metal Industries  28  4.8% 
Transportation 20  3.4% 
Services 7  1.2% 
Subtotal other sectors  124  21.4% 
Total 580  100.0% 
 
Table 4.  Definitions of Control Variables 
Values are measured quarterly except as indicated.  Balance sheet values are measured at the end of each 
quarter.  Market values of shares for each quarter are the average value for that quarter. 
Variable Description 
Ln(Tobin’s  q)  Log of [Market value of assets / Book value of assets]. Market value of assets is 
estimated as [market value of common stock + market value of preferred stock + book 
value of debt]. 
Ln(Market/Sales Ratio)  Log of [Market value of common stock + market value of preferred stock/Sales]. 
Ln(Market/Book Ratio)  Log of [Market value of common stock + market value of preferred stock/Book value of 
assets]. 
Ln(RTS Index)  Log of Russian Trading System (RTS) index at each quarter end. 
Ln(Number of trades)  Log of the sum of number of trades of firm’s common and proffered stock in the RTS 
during the quarter. 
Ln(Assets)  Log of Book value of assets. 
Leverage  [Book value of debt/Book value of assets], winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
Ln(Capital Intensity)  [Book value of fixed assets/Book value of sales]. 
MSCI Index Dummy  1 if firm is included in the Morgan Stanley Capital International Index at July 2005 (we 
were not able to obtain historical data); 0 otherwise. 
Sales Growth  Real annual growth rate of sales over the current year, winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
Net Income to Assets  Net income over total assets, winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
Index  Dummies  Dummy variables, =1 for an observation with a particular governance index and 0 
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Table 5.  Panel A.  Summary Statistics 
Based on all available observations for each variable. 
  No. of obs. Mean Min  median Max  Std.  Dev. 
Tobin’s q  580 1.31  0.19  1.08  10.10 1.02 
Ln(Tobin’s q)  580 0.04  -1.65  0.08  2.31 0.68 
Ln(Market/Sales)  608 0.39  -6.52  0.25  8.45 1.47 
Ln(Market/Book)  591 0.25  -3.67  0.11  6.78 1.47 
Brunswick  155 -0.01  -3.64  0.23  1.66  1.00 
TROIKA  276 0.00  -2.05  0.02 2.10  1.00 
S&P Governance  44 0.00  -1.84  0.01  2.21 1.00 
S&P Disclosure  136 0.02  -2.04  -0.13  2.68 1.00 
ICLG  328 0.00  -2.50  -0.03  3.19 1.00 
RID  212 0.01  -2.76  0.40  2.50 1.00 
Quarter-averaged index  833  -0.07  -3.64  -0.06  3.19  0.96 
Ln(RTS)  833 5.96  4.83  6.22  6.62 0.50 
Ln(Assets)  744 23.96  20.02  23.95  28.55 1.58 
Log (No. of trades)  660 3.82  0.00  3.64  9.24 2.06 
Ln(Leverage)  684 0.46  0.02  0.38  1.00 0.28 
Sales Growth  761 0.07  -1.67  0.05  1.82 0.41 
MSCI Index Dummy  833 0.26  0.00  0.00  1.00 0.44 
Net Income/ Assets  698 0.05  -0.10  0.03  0.36 0.07 
Ln(Capital Intensity)  629 -0.20  -5.30  0.08  2.94  1.38 
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Table 5. Panel B. Correlation coefficients for selected variables 
Number of observations for each pair is reported underneath each correlation coefficient. Rankings data for individual indices (but not the aggregate quarter-averaged index) 
are linearly interpolated for missing firm-quarters; see notes to Figure 1 for details. * and boldface indicates significance at 5% level.  
  [1] [2]  [3] [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]  [8]  [9]  [10]  [11] [12]  [13]  [14]  [15] [16] [17] [18] 
[1]  Ln(Tobin’s  q) 1                           
  579                           
[2] Ln(Market-to-Sales)  0.6103* 1                           
  574  607                          
[3] Ln(Market-to-Book)  0.8438* 0.4958*  1                         
  557 585  590                        
[4] Brunswick  0.3190* 0.2593*  0.1309  1                      
  156 158  145  230                      
[5] TROIKA  0.3251* 0.4722* 0.2078*  0.6674* 1                     
  429 455  444 181  551                    
[6] S&P Governance  0.1437  0.6297*  0.0484  0.7702* 0.6218* 1                    
 78  80  80  25 79  94                   
[7] S&P Disclosure  0.4680* 0.4810* 0.3012*  0.5115*  0.6343* 0.5416*  1                  
  257 258  259  25  236 67  303                 
[8] ICLG  0.0133  0.2804*  -0.0036  0.4054* 0.5613* 0.6019*  0.6561*  1                
 276  284  277  121 310  44  138  330               
[9] RID  0.1952* 0.1465  0.126  .  0.4028* -0.2055  0.5496*  .   1              
 139  142  138  0  48  18  62  0  218             
[10]  0.1756* 0.3255* 0.1120*  0.8106*  0.7648* 0.8075* 0.7683*  0.9360* 0.8796* 1           
 
Quarter-averaged 
index  579 607  590 230  551 94  303 330  218  833          
[11] Ln(RTS)  0.054  0.0598  0.0815* 0.3783*  -0.0132 0.2105* 0.2048*  0.0791  0.2742* 0.0847*  1          
 579  607  590 230  551  94 303  330  218 833  833         
[12] Ln(Assets)  0.1927* 0.2201* 0.2210*  -0.0249  0.1639* 0.0832 0.1165  0.0561  0.2763* 0.0947*  0.0352  1        
  579 607  590 185  488  81 266  309  177 700  700  700        
[13] Log (No. of trades)  0.3787* 0.4021* 0.3767* 0.0052  0.3152* 0.0804  0.3083*  -0.0416 0.2921* 0.1434* -0.082251        
  562 587  569 174  472  80  270  300  157 659  659  631  659       
[14] Ln(Leverage)  0.5639* 0.0417  0.6993*  -0.0331  -0.1004* -0.2985*  0.1081  -0.2554* 0.0572 -0.1131*  -0.0713  0.1253* 0.1504*  1      
  579  574  557  179  452 79  262  296  159  645  645  645 587 645      
[15] Sales Growth  0.0024  -0.0213  0.0251  0.1534* 0.1182* 0.1539  0.1490*  0.0745 0.1498* 0.1418*  -0.0238  -0.0695  0.0025  -0.0436  1     
 577  605  587  188 489  81  270  310 186 713  713  690  634  641  713     
[16]  0.3407* 0.3270* 0.3150* 0.0986  0.2888* 0.2791* 0.3373*  0.2080* 0.2025* 0.2240*  -0.1097* 0.4111* 0.5503* 0.1247* 0.1814*  1     
 
MSCI Index 
Dummy  579 607  590 230  551 94  303  330  218  833  833 700  659  645 713 833     
[17] Net Income/Assets  0.3308* 0.0234  0.2379* 0.1679*  0.1813* -0.0477  0.1294*  0.076 -0.0108 0.0789*  -0.0168  0.1257* 0.2019* -0.0452 0.1261* 0.2066*  1   
  565  591  569 181  464 81  261  302 160 656  656  656 595 626 652 656 656   
[18]  -0.4923* 0.0427  -0.3582* -0.2195* -0.1553* -0.144  -0.1341*  0.0574 0.0701 -0.032  -0.0353  -0.1306* -0.1205* -0.2617* 0.0173 -0.0877* -0.4064  1 
 
Ln(Capital 
Intensity)  513  544  528 136  423 79  254  273 161 599  599  599 543 567 595 599 581 599 
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Table 5. Panel C. Correlation coefficients for subindices within each index. 
Correlation coefficients are presented for the four rankings that we have data on subindicies. Rankings data for individual subindices is not interpolated. Boldface indicates 
significance at 5% level.  
 Brunswick  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]     S&P  Disclosure  [1] [2] [3] 
[1]  Transparency  1.000            [1]  Ownership structure and investor 
relations  1.000    
[2]  Dilution  0.039  1.000           [2]  Financial and operational 
information  0.678  1.000  
[3]  Asset transfers / 
transfer pricing  0.204  0.075  1.000          [3]  Board and management structure 
and process  0.870 0.670 1.000 
[4] Mergers  /  restructuring  0.052  0.175  -0.040  1.000                  
[5] Bankruptcy  0.303  0.042 0.099 0.205  1.000                 
[6]  Ownership  restrictions  -0.155  -0.058  0.059  0.153  0.142  1.000               
[7]  Corporate governance 
initiatives  0.097 0.145 -0.198  -0.062 0.186 0.202  1.000             
[8] Registrar  0.143  0.256  -0.143 0.034 0.218  -0.168  0.282  1.000           
 
 
 Troika  [1] [2] [3]  [4]    S&P  Governance  [1] [2] [3]  [4] 
[1]  Ownership structure and 
transparency  1.000        [1]  Ownership structure and 
influence  1.000      
[2]  Oversight and control structure  0.286  1.000      [2]  Financial stakeholder rights 
and relations  0.394  1.000    
[3]  Management and investor 
relations  0.301  -0.037 1.000      [3]  Financial transparency and 
information disclosure  0.692 0.789 1.000  
[4]  Information disclosure and 
financial discipline  0.428  0.105  0.254  1.000  [4]  Board structure and process  0.753 0.770 0.759  1.000 
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Table 6. OLS Results for Different Governance Measures 
Ordinary least squares regressions of ln(Tobin's q) on different governance indices, with additional control 
variables as shown.  Governance indices and other variables are defined in Tables 1 and 4.  t-values, based on robust 
standard errors with firm clusters, are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels.  Significant results (at 5% level or better) for principal variables are shown in boldface.  
dependent variable  ln(Tobin’s q) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Brunswick  0.204***         
 [2.87]         
TROIKA    0.191***        
    [6.54]        
S&P Governance    0.099**       
    [2.68]       
S&P Disclosure     0.240***      
     [3.43]      
lCLG      0.207***     
      [3.50]     
RID       0.108    
       [ 1 . 3 6 ]     
Quarter-averaged index        0.174*** 0.147*** 
        [4.01] [3.28] 
Ln(RTS index)  0.04  0.310***  0.270* 0.203  0.234***  -1.969  0.198*** 0.203*** 
  [0.28]  [4.77]  [2.10] [1.26] [3.16]  [1.25]  [3.88] [3.98] 
Ln(Assets)  -0.131  -0.231*** -0.112 -0.162 -0.117** -0.195** -0.161*** -0.146** 
  [0.95]  [3.54]  [1.52] [1.31] [2.22] [2.42] [2.98] [2.34] 
Ln(No. of trades)  0.130**  0.092**  -0.005 0.045  0.119*** 0.164*** 0.101*** 0.105*** 
 [2.59]  [2.40]  [0.20] [0.59] [2.96] [3.03] [2.87] [2.67] 
Ln(Leverage)  1.017*** 1.043*** 1.431*** 0.748*** 0.731*** 0.773*** 0.793*** 0.764*** 
  [2.99] [5.79] [7.72] [3.15] [3.53] [4.90] [5.42] [5.67] 
Sales Growth  -0.230*  -0.200**  -0.02  -0.019 -0.081 -0.163 -0.112 -0.127 
  [1.96]  [2.10]  [0.24] [0.16] [0.64] [1.22] [1.45] [1.49] 
MSCI Index Dummy  -0.089 0.213  0.474***  0.111 -0.091  0.267*  0.105 0.104 
  [0.35] [1.67] [6.81]  [0.67] [0.53] [1.72] [0.78] [0.81] 
Net Income/ Assets  1.54  1.537**  0.712  1.880** 1.216***  1.761** 1.145** 0.766 
  [1.49]  [2.32]  [0.70]  [2.07] [2.85] [2.27] [2.31] [1.32] 
Ln(Capital Intensity)         -0.082** 
         [2.31] 
Sector: Communication  0.053 -0.158  -0.343*** -0.439**  -0.013 -0.33  -0.128 -0.015 
  [0.27] [1.29] [5.60] [2.22] [0.11] [1.65] [1.12] [0.10] 
Sector: Utilities  -0.253 -0.315*** -0.503*** -0.469*** -0.680*** -0.408*** -0.485*** -0.383***
  [1.17] [2.78] [3.93] [2.76] [5.41] [2.92] [4.82] [3.35] 
Sector: Extraction  0.25  0.387**  0  0.273  0.443*** 0.265  0.412*** 0.363*** 
  [0.79] [2.44] [.]  [1.26] [3.58] [1.33] [3.07] [2.85] 
Constant  1.876 2.885**  0.539 2.325 0.718 16.345  1.995*  1.56 
  [0.67] [2.29] [0.35] [0.82] [0.69] [1.61] [1.73] [1.18] 
Number of Obs.  95  184 34  106 264 127 549 491 
Number of firms  23 50 11 44 32 98 105  104 
R-squared  0.68 0.76 0.90 0.68 0.82 0.55 0.69 0.70 
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Table 7. OLS results for combined governance measures 
Ordinary least squares regressions of ln(Tobin's q) on different combined governance indices, with additional 
control variables as shown.  Governance indices and other variables are defined in Tables 1 and 4.  t-values, 
based on robust standard errors with firm clusters, are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  Significant results (at 5% level or better) for principal variables are 
shown in boldface. 
 
Pooled OLS (firm clusters)  ln(Tobin’s q) 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Quarter-averaged index  0.174***      
 [4.01]      
Quarter-averaged index (No RID)    0.207***    
    [5.14]    
Pooled index     0.164***   
     [4.57]   
Pooled index (No RID)       0.183*** 
       [5.07] 
Ln(RTS) 0.198***  0.256***  0.256***  0.254*** 
 [3.87]  [4.33]  [4.36]  [4.21] 
Ln(Assets) -0.161***  -0.203*** -0.181***  -0.181*** 
 [2.99]  [3.15]  [2.91]  [2.82] 
Ln(No. of trades)  0.101***  0.099**  0.100**  0.095** 
 [2.87]  [2.62]  [2.55]  [2.32] 
Ln(Leverage) 0.793***  0.844***  0.803***  0.853*** 
 [5.42]  [4.57]  [5.20]  [4.65] 
Ln(Sales Growth)  -0.115  -0.154**  -0.145* -0.141* 
  [1.51]  [2.10]  [1.97] [1.79] 
MSCI Index Dummy  0.104 0.116  0.11 0.094 
  [0.77] [0.87]  [0.76]  [0.63] 
Ln(Net Income to Assets)    1.149**  1.274**  1.377***  1.371** 
 [2.32]  [2.34]  [2.89]  [2.52] 
Sector: Communication  -0.129 -0.218* -0.178  -0.177 
  [1.13] [1.83]  [1.60]  [1.63] 
Sector: Utilities  -0.485*** -0.485***  -0.487***  -0.486*** 
  [4.82] [4.33]  [4.98]  [4.53] 
Sector: Extraction  0.412*** 0.405***  0.382***  0.379** 
  [3.08] [2.85]  [2.68]  [2.56] 
Constant  1.999* 2.701** 2.209*  2.221* 
  [1.74] [2.09]  [1.71]  [1.71] 
Index dummy: TROIKA     -0.027  -0.032 
     [0.64]  [0.73] 
Index dummy: SPCG     -0.002  -0.008 
     [0.02]  [0.12] 
Index dummy: S&P     -0.028  -0.03 
     [0.56]  [0.60] 
Index dummy: ICLG     -0.052  -0.053 
     [0.99]  [0.97] 
Index dummy: RID     -0.179**   
     [2.28]   
Number of Observations  549 480  810  683 
Number of firms  105 54  105  54 
R-squared  0.69 0.73  0.70  0.73 
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Table 8. Summary Results for Ln(Tobin’s q) 
Coefficients on governance indices for ordinary least squares regressions, firm random effects, and firm fixed 
effects regressions of ln(Tobin's  q) on different governance indices. Each cell gives the coefficient from a 
separate regression.  Control variables are the same as in Table 6, except that (i) MSCI index dummy and sector 
dummies are omitted in firm fixed effects regressions; and (ii) only regressions (4-6) include ln(capital intensity) 
as a control variable.  Governance indices and other variables are defined in Tables 1 and 4.  All regressions 
use robust standard errors; pooled OLS regressions use firm clusters.  t- or z-values are reported in parentheses.  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  Significant results (at 5% level or better) are 
shown in boldface.   






















ln(capital intensity)  no yes 
Brunswick 0.204***  0.252***  0.248***  95  0.271*** 0.277***  0.209** 68 
 [2.87]  [3.28]  [2.97]    [2.93] [3.18]  [2.28]   
TROIKA 0.191***  0.157***  0.138***  184  0.175*** 0.149***  0.118** 153 
 [6.54]  [4.71]  [3.74]    [4.56] [3.91]  [2.57]   
SPCG 0.099**  0.099 0.048  34  0.072* 0.072  0.06  32 
 [2.68]  [1.53] [0.81]    [1.96] [1.00]  [1.07]   
S&P disclosure  0.240***  0.102**  0.065  106  0.183**  0.039 0.031  99 
 [3.43]  [2.03]  [1.09]    [2.21]  [0.80] [0.56]   
ICLG 0.207***  0.126***  0.112***  264  0.155*** 0.096***  0.064** 240 
  [3.50]  [4.11] [3.48]    [2.99] [3.36]  [2.28]   
RID  0.108 0.009  -0.04 127  0.088 0.005  -0.04  126 
  [1.36] [0.24]  [0.96]   [1.08] [0.15]  [0.92]   
0.174*** 0.059***  0.060*** 549  0.147*** 0.044**  0.044** 491  Quarter-averaged 
index  [4.01] [3.15]  [3.11]   [3.28] [2.53]  [2.51]   
0.206*** 0.081***  0.067*** 480  0.180*** 0.060***  0.044** 423  Quarter-averaged 
index (no RID)  [5.13]  [4.02]  [3.24]    [4.17] [3.17]  [2.33]   
Pooled index  0.164***  0.051***  0.052***  810  0.136*** 0.034***  0.035***  683 
 [4.57]  [3.90]  [4.12]    [3.44] [2.88]  [3.17]   
0.183*** 0.072***  0.063*** 718  0.155*** 0.048***  0.039***  592  Pooled index (no 
RID) [5.07]  [4.85]  [4.35]    [4.02] [3.55]  [3.00]   
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Table 9. Summary Results for Market/Book and Market/Sales 
Coefficients on governance indices for ordinary least squares regressions, firm random effects, and 
firm fixed effects regressions of ln(Tobin's q) on different governance indices.  Each cell gives the 
coefficient from a separate regression.  Control variables are the same as in Table 7, except that MSCI 
index dummy and sector dummies are omitted in firm fixed effects regressions.  Governance indices 
and other variables are defined in Tables 1 and 4.  All regressions use robust standard errors; pooled 
OLS regressions use firm clusters.  t- or z-values are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  Significant results (at 5% level or better) are shown in 
boldface. 






















Brunswick  95  0.480** 0.674***  0.774***  87 0.013  0.277  0.243 
    [2.25] [2.84]  [2.87]   [0.05]  [1.46]  [1.37] 
TROIKA  184  0.606*** 0.551***  0.527***  176  0.288** 0.275***  0.239*** 
    [3.72] [5.83]  [5.10]    [2.37] [3.34]  [3.18] 
SPCG  34  0.586*** 0.586***  0.351* 34  0.268**  0.162 0.268* 
    [4.37] [3.09]  [1.98]    [2.87]  [1.15] [1.89] 
S&P disclosure  106  0.685*** 0.451***  0.295  106 0.173  0.062  0.042 
    [3.18] [2.63]  [1.28]   [1.09]  [0.63]  [0.48] 
ICLG  264  0.388** 0.319***  0.290**  255  0.270** 0.103**  0.106** 
    [2.64] [3.16]  [2.48]    [2.05] [2.16]  [2.21] 
RID  127 0.307  0.056  0.03  121 0.084  0.056  0.048 
    [1.32]  [0.72] [0.36]   [0.66] [0.73]  [0.76] 
549  0.470*** 0.180***  0.166**  527  0.216** 0.088**  0.078**  Quarter-averaged 
index    [3.34] [2.79]  [2.41]    [2.07] [2.35]  [2.13] 
480  0.571***  0.275***  0.236***  463  0.256** 0.096**  0.104***  Quarter-averaged 
index (no RID)    [3.94] [3.96]  [3.24]    [2.28] [2.44]  [2.67] 
Pooled index  810  0.136*** 0.034***  0.035***  779  0.199** 0.080***  0.073*** 
    [3.44] [2.88]  [3.17]    [2.02] [3.31]  [2.85] 
683  0.155*** 0.048***  0.039***  658  0.237** 0.098***  0.106***  Pooled index (no 
RID)    [4.02] [3.55]  [3.00]    [2.27] [3.51]  [3.66] 
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Table 10. Regressions with subindices 
Coefficients on governance indices for pooled OLS, firm random effects, and firm fixed effects regressions of ln(Tobin's q) on sub indices of the Brunswick, Troika, S&P Disclosure, 
and S&P Governance indices.  Control variables are the same as in Table 7, except that MSCI index dummy and sector dummies are omitted in firm fixed effects regressions.  
Governance indices and other variables are defined in Tables 1 and 4.  All regressions use robust standard errors; pooled OLS regressions use firm clusters.  t- or z-values are 
reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  Significant results (at 5% level or better) are shown in boldface. 
dependent variable  Ln(Tobin's q) 
  Pooled OLS (firm clusters)  Firm Random Effects  Firm Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Troika                   
0.066       0.088**      0.082*       Ownership structure and 
transparency [1.14]        [2.03]      [1.81]      
0.098      0.021      0.033       Oversight and control 
structure  [1.60]      [0.50]      [0.73]      
0.072      0.054      0.046       Management and investor 
relations  [1.55]      [1.37]      [1.14]      
Corporate  conduct  -0.031      0.044      0.092**     
  [0.74]      [1.19]      [2.31]     
0.186***      0.143***      0.096*       Information disclosure and 
financial discipline  [3.56]      [3.07]      [1.87]      
Brunswick                   
Transparency   0.012      0.043**      0.048**    
   [0.56]      [2.10]      [2.14]    
Dilution   -0.028      0.013       0.02     
   [1.28]      [0.77]       [1.21]     
  0.079**      0.127***      0.148***     Asset transfers / transfer 
pricing     [2.59]      [5.62]      [5.92]    
Mergers  /  restructuring   0.003      -0.007       -0.005     
   [0.14]      [0.47]       [0.30]     
Bankruptcy   0.03      0.050*       0.063*     
   [0.94]      [1.79]       [1.83]     
Ownership  restrictions   0.026      0.159       0.343**    
   [0.24]      [1.35]       [2.10]    
  0.060*       0.007      -0.028     Corporate governance 
initiatives   [1.95]       [0.22]      [0.84]    
Registrar   0.351      0.044       0.121     
   [1.57]      [0.24]       [0.50]     
S&P Disclosure                   
   -0.006      0      0.006    Ownership structure and 
investor  relations     [1.24]      [0.07]      [1.32]   
   0.019***       0.006**      0.001    Financial and operational 
information     [3.39]       [2.01]      [0.15]   
   0      0      -0.002    Board and management 
structure  and  process     [0.07]      [0.02]      [0.54]   
S&P Governance                   
    0.120**      0.120*      0.016  Ownership structure and 
influence       [2.59]      [1.79]      [0.27]   35
    -0.024      -0.024      0.049  Financial stakeholder rights 
and relations      [0.27]      [0.21]      [0.48] 
    -0.025      -0.025      -0.195*  Financial transparency and 
information  disclosure      [0.19]      [0.26]      [2.13] 
Board structure and process       -0.003      -0.003      0.104 
      [0.03]      [0.03]      [0.94] 
No.  of  observations  183 95  106 34  183 95  106  34  183 95  106  34 
No.  of  firms  50 23  44 11  50 23 44  11  50 23 44  11 
R-sq  within        0.39  0.59 0.52  0.55  0.43 0.62 0.6  0.81 
R-sq  between        0.77  0.62 0.65  0.98  0.31 0.27 0.11  0.1 
R-sq  overall  0.77 0.76  0.73 0.91  0.72 0.62 0.66  0.91  0.23 0.31 0.11  0.28   - 36 -
Figure 1: Corporate governance indices over time 
Average interpolated standardized corporate governance scores for each governance index. All indices are 
standardized with mean =0; σ = 1, and positive scores indicating better governance. If a firm was ranked in 
quarter t with score Rt and next ranked in quarter t+k with score Rt+k, we assign a score in quarter t+i (for t < 
t+i < t+k) using linear interpolation: Rt+i= [(k-i)*Rt + i*Rt+k]/k.  For each index, we then take average of 
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Figure 2: Average corporate governance growth 
We calculate accumulated average corporate governance growth using two approaches. Under the first 
approach (red line) all rankings are standardized with zero mean and dispersion of one. Then we interpolate 
standardized scores using linear interpolation: if a firm was ranked in quarter t with score Rt and next time in 
quarter t+k with score Rt+k, we assign score Rt+i= [(k-i) Rt + i Rt+k]/k in quarter t+i. Under the second approach 
(blue line) we first interpolate original scores and then convert all rankings to Troika’s scale using the fact that 
all rankings are correlated and Troika’s ranking overlaps with all other rankings. The following steps are 
identical in both methods. Fore each firm we take average of all available rankings in a quarter, and calculate 
growth compared to previous quarter. Then we calculate average growth across firms and accumulated 
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Figure 3. Scatter plot of (log) Tobin Q and aggregate governance index   
The regression line is given by (t-statistics estimated with firm clusters in parenthesis): 
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